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ARTICLES
ARTIST/MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS AND
THE ENGLISH MUSIC TRILOGY: ANOTHER
BRITISH INVASION?t
Michael I Yanover*
Harvey G. Kotler, Q.C.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imposing obligations on an artist who signs lengthy, complicated,
long-term agreements that affect his career and his ability to make a living is considered unfair. These agreements often have far reaching effects
which continue after the contract's duration. Artists often feel that these
agreements exist primarily for the benefit of managers, publishers and
record companies.' For the most part, the industry expects artists to
accept and sign so called "standard form agreements." Many view an
artist's refusal to sign these agreements without the benefit of counsel as
an early breach of faith indicating a deep lack of trust.2 In a parallel
view, held by many nonartists, the artist gratefully accepts and signs the
standard form agreement at the beginning of his career on the basis of an
unwritten inducement or assurance of a future renegotiation. Money is
advanced and clauses are amended when the artist achieves measurable
success. 3
No legislation in California dictates or prescribes either the functions of the personal manager or his obligations to the artist. However,
t
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1. Hertz, The Regulation of Artist Representation in the EntertainmentIndustry, 8 LoY.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 55, 56 (1988).
2. This view has prevailed throughout the music management industry for many years.
3. See, e.g., Elton Hercules John v. Richard Leon James, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 1982 J. No. 15026 (Nov. 29, 1985).
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the American Federation of Musicians [hereinafter AF of M], an international musicians trade union, attempts to control personal management
activities by regulating booking agents. According to the AF of M, only
the booking agent may procure employment for the artist.4 The booking
agent must be licensed by the AF of M and, if he is not, AF of M members are forbidden from employing his services.5 The AF of M allows the
booking agent, who is retained for ongoing representation, to receive a
maximum of fifteen percent of the artist's gross receipts.6
The AF of M defines the personal manager as one who is responsible
for the day-to-day and long-term development of the artist's career and
one who offers advice and guidance to the artist.7 The personal manager
cannot procure employment for the artist and may receive a maximum of
only five percent of the artist's gross receipts (beyond the fifteen percent
agent's fee) for managerial services rendered.8 This provision extends
only to those licensed booking agents who also engage in personal management activities and does not extend to those who act solely as personal managers.
In practice, separating the functions and activities of personal managers and booking agents is difficult, since the personal manager often
fulfills both roles. In addition, personal managers often charge fees well
in excess of the maximum quoted by the AF of M for managerial services
(usually as much as twenty-five percent).9 However, unlike the booking
agent, the manager often forfeits his commissions in the early years of the
artist's career, hoping for greater future financial rewards.
The AF of M, faced with the practice of managers acting in the dual
capacity of agent and manager and in contravention of its rules, is left
with the sole remedy of exercising its authority under its international
constitution to disallow or revoke booking agent licenses and suspend or
4. By-Laws of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada,

[hereinafter By-Laws of the AFofM] revised Sept. 15, 1987, art. 23, § 2.
5. By-Laws of the AF of M, art. 23, § 5.
6. By-Laws of the AF of M, art. 23, §§ 2-6, 8.
7. Personal Management Agreement of the AF of M. The Agreement loosely defines a
personal manager as one who "aid[s] (artists) in furthering their careers..." and one who "[i]s
experienced and qualified to manage the business affairs of the Artists, and assist them in the

furtherance of their professional careers as entertainers .... The personal manager undertakes a duty to "advise and counsel" the artist(s) in the areas of selection of literary, artistic
and musical materials, publicity and public relations, format of presentation of the artist's
talents, selection of booking agents, employment selection and all other duties personal manag-

ers 'customarily perform.'" Id. at § 1 (a)-(f).
8. By-Laws of the AF of M, art. 23, § 8.

9. Hertz, supra note 1, at 55-56 n.4 (citing S.SHEMEL & M.
NESS OF MUSIC 86 (1985)).

KRASILOVSKY,

THIS BuSI-

1989]

CONTRACTS

expel those members who deal with unlicensed booking agents. This ineffective remedy is rarely imposed or enforced. 10
In considering the enforceability of management, recording and
publishing agreements, entertainment professionals and artists in the music industry have little precedent to guide them. In the absence of precedent and apart from general contract law, the California Labor Code and
a recent trilogy of English cases provide the primary basis for considering
issues arising from contracts in the music industry.
II.

THE CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE

The Talent Agencies Act," a part of the California Labor Code,
provides a controversial approach to the protection of artists' rights to
receive payment for their efforts. Like the By-Laws of the AF of M, this
Act regulates only the booking agent and distinguishes between the
booking agent and personal manager. The Act defines a booking agent
as one who procures employment or attempts to procure employment for
an artist. 2 The Act also gives legislative force to the various tariffs established by California entertainment trade unions, including those of the
AF of M. 13
Conflicts result because the manager often fulfills the functions of a
booking agent while charging fees well in excess of the AF of M's tariff.
Problems between a manager and an artist find their way to the Labor
Commissioner in the form of a complaint against the manager. The Labor Commissioner, upon finding that the manager (who is not licensed as
a booking agent) has attempted to procure or has procured employment
for the artist, may find that the contract between the parties is void and
unenforceable. 4 Based on that finding, the Labor Commissioner may
order all fees and commissions that the manager received under the contract to be returned to the artist.' 5
Therefore, although the Act does not specifically regulate personal
managers, an artist who can demonstrate that his manager has engaged
10. By-Laws of the AF of M, art. 23, § 3.
11. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1989). For general discussions thereof, see Hertz, supra note 1; P.R. Green & B.R. Green, Talent Agents and the New
California Act, 9:4 ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER 3 (1987); Feller, California'sRevised
Talent Agencies Act: Fine Tuning the Regulation of Employment Procurementin the Entertainment Industry, 5:3 ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAWYER 3 (1986).
12. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
13. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
14. Buchwald v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347, 353-56, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 364, 370-72 (1967).
15. Id at 355, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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in booking agent activities as an unlicensed agent may challenge his management agreement. The artist may do this even if the agreement specifically restricts the manager to management activities, and the parties are
mutual beneficiaries of a legitimate management agreement. 16 In essence, the Talent Agencies Act, which was originally designed to provide
artists with income protection, is now used by artists to terminate contracts with managers who no longer suit the artists' purposes.' 7 Managers, faced with this threat, may decide to either license themselves as
agents, thereby subjecting themselves to the Talent Agencies Act, or refrain from engaging in agent activities. The former proposition is economically unfeasible given the AF of M's tariff and the risks which the
manager must assume.' 8 The latter proposition is difficult to achieve in
practice, given the nature of personal management activities.
However, two amendments in 1982 to the Talent Agencies Act have
made this latter proposition somewhat easier to achieve. The first
amendment allows personal managers to procure employment for artists'
recording contracts without being licensed agents. 19 The second amendment allows managers to work in conjunction with agents without being
subjected to the Act.2 °
The Talent Agencies Act essentially regulates the procurement of
contracts, protects artists' income and prevents unscrupulous and
oppressive conduct regarding the most critical source of an artist's livelihood: the sale of his skill and copyrights. However, a manager who
can successfully remove himself from the scope of the Act can relieve
himself from regulation thereunder, and as such, his conduct will be governed by common law.
III.

THE ENGLISH

Music TRILOGY

The "English music trilogy" consists of three cases concerning artists who signed so-called "standard form industry agreements" early in
their careers. These artists ultimately became successful. The trilogy
raises questions which American courts have yet to consider fully, and
16. Id. However, pursuant to the newly added California Labor Code § 1700.44(c), an
action against an unlicensed booking agent must be commenced within one year of the alleged
violation under the Act. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c) (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
17. Nimoy, PersonalManagersand the California Talent Agencies Act: For Whom the Bill
Toils, 2 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. J. 145, 163-64 (1982).
18. Johnson & Lang, The PersonalManager in the CaliforniaEntertainment Industry, 52
S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 411-12 (1979).
19. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
20. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(d) (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).

1989]

CONTRACTS

provides a useful series of fact situations and decisions which appear to
jeopardize industry practices common in England and the United States.
The trilogy is comprised of the cases of A. SchroederMusic Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay2 ("Schroeder"), Clifford Davis Management
Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd.22 ("Davis") and O'Sullivan v. Management
Agency and Music Ltd.2 3 ("O'Sullivan ").
The House of Lords decided Schroeder in October 1974, on appeal
from the English Court of Appeal. The case involved a young songwriter
who entered into a standard form agreement with a music publishing
company which gave the publishing company his exclusive services for
five years and a perpetual worldwide assignment of his copyrights. 24 Additionally, if the songwriter's royalties equalled or exceeded five thousand
pounds, the agreement was extended automatically for another five year
term. The publishing company had a unilateral right to terminate the
agreement at any time by giving one month's notice, as well as the right
to assign the agreement or any particular work of the songwriter, which
included all the rights and obligations under the agreement. 2 5 No such
rights were given to the songwriter and, under the terms of the contract,
the publisher had no obligation to publish anything. The court in
Schroeder found the publishing contract to constitute an unreasonable
restraint of trade and the agreement to be contrary to public policy. Ac26
cordingly, the contract was found to be void.
The English Court of Appeal decided the Davis case only a few days
after the House of Lords decided Schroeder. Davis involved two members of the pop group "Fleetwood Mac," who were experienced performers and composers, but inexperienced business persons. 27 They signed
five year standard form publishing agreements with their manager, which
were only renewable at the manager's option. The manager received royalties from the copyrights, and retained the right to assign or transfer the
copyrights without the composers' consent. The agreements were unilateral to the extent that they imposed no duty to perform on the manager.
The court also found that the composers signed the contracts without the
aid of independent legal advice.28
21.
[1974]
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

[1974] 3 All E.R. 616. See also Instone v. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd.,
1 All E.R. 171 (C.A.).
[1975] 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.).
[1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, [1985] 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A.).
Schroeder, [1974] 3 All E.R. at 618.
Id. at 619.
Id at 622.
Davis, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 240.
Id. at 241.
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The manager, Clifford Davis, brought an action against the record
company, WEA Records, to obtain an interim injunction restraining
WEA from selling recordings of the composers' works. Davis claimed
the exclusive rights to the works under his agreements with the composers. The composers, despite their agreements with Davis, had transferred these rights to WEA. The Court of Appeal set aside the lower
court order granting Davis an interim injunction and held that since the
record company had established a prima facie case of an inequality of
bargaining power between the manager and the composers, the agreements were unenforceable.2 9
O'Sullivan, the final case of the trilogy, was decided by the English
Court of Appeal in February 1984. The artist's personal manager, Mills,
was a substantial shareholder in the management company, which owned
both the publishing and recording companies, the latter of which Mills
was chairman of the board.30 The artist, Gilbert O'Sullivan, signed contracts with each of these companies. A third party, Smith, had a substantial interest in and was the managing director of each of these
companies. Smith also managed a company set up to receive
O'Sullivan's profits earned outside the United Kingdom. Smith drafted
the recording and publishing agreements that O'Sullivan signed.
O'Sullivan was a young, unknown composer and performer, wholly inexperienced in business when he signed these agreements.3 1
O'Sullivan brought an action seeking declarations that these agreements were void ab initio on the grounds that they imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade and were obtained by undue influence. By the
time of trial, all of the agreements had been performed and had lapsed.3 2
The trial judge found that the agreements restrained trade and that Mills,
together with these four associated companies, owed a fiduciary duty to
O'Sullivan. The trial judge presumed that these agreements were obtained by undue influence.3 3 The defendants appealed the trial court's
findings of undue influence against the companies-to the Court of Appeal. That court addressed three specific issues. First, since a fiduciary
relationship existed, the agreements were presumed to have been obtained by undue influence. Thus, the court had to decide whether the
agreements were void or voidable. Second, since the agreements had
been fully performed, the court had to determine the appropriate rem29. Id.
30. O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, 454.

31. Id. at 453.
32. Id. at 457.
33. Id.
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edy. Third, the court had to determine the appropriate rate of interest to
be applied to the plaintiff's award.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's findings of undue influence, but found the contracts voidable rather than void.3 4 The court
ordered all of the companies to provide an accounting of profits, plus a
return of copyrights and a reassignment of mechanical copyrights to
O'Sullivan. 5
The English music trilogy raises issues in seven important areas.
1. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade
English courts have refused to enforce agreements which contain
provisions that are contrary to public policy. Betting contracts fall under
this category, as do contracts which could be found to unreasonably restrain trade, such as contracts restricting an individual from making a
living.36
In Schroeder, the court concerned itself with a five year publishing
contract which would automatically be renewed for another term if total
revenue exceeded the stated amount.37 The court in Schroeder noted that
the publisher made no "satisfactory positive undertaking" to publish the
artist's compositions.38 The court found, absent any obligation of the
publisher to publish, that binding the composer for ten years would be an
unreasonable restraint of trade.39 If the publisher chose not to publish,
then the composer's earning capacity would be destroyed. During these
deliberations, the court noted that the doctrine of unreasonable restraint
of trade does not usually apply to the restrictions found in this case.'
The court held that these restrictions could be reasonably enforced in a
manner oppressive to the composer, and thus were unjustifiable. 4
The form and clauses of the contract in Schroeder are well known in
the entertainment industry. The issue following Schroeder is whether a
refusal to enforce an agreement in these circumstances, based upon the
court's unwillingness to enforce an agreement containing an unreasona34. Id. at 467.
35. Regarding the rate of interest to be paid, the court ordered the defendants to make
"varied" interest payments (i.e., both simple and compound) to O'Sullivan, with credits for
taxes paid or payable. Id at 470.
36. See Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport), Ltd., [1967] 1 All E.R.
699.
37. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616, 618.
38. Id. at 622.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 621-22.
41. Schroeder, [1974] 3 All E.R. at 622.
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ble restraint of trade, might be extended to personal management and
recording agreements. These agreements usually contain unilateral or
automatic rights of renewal. Most of them do not contain, as in Schroeder, a "means test," which requires performance as a condition for the
exercise of the option or renewal provision. Thus, the question is
whether all clauses allowing unilateral or automatic rights of renewal are
void. In Schroeder, the court suggested that the contract might have
been valid had it contained a provision entitling the composer to terminate. Lord Reid also implied that a contract involving an automatic
right of renewal must be molded by the pressure of negotiation which
usually occurs when established composers bargain on equal terms with
management, publishing and record companies.4 2
Although standard form agreements with less than established composers may more easily be found to be invalid, the courts have also found
an inequality of bargaining power where the composers are experienced
and established. 43 The Schroeder court left open the questions of how
much negotiation should be involved and whether the composer should
be represented by counsel in these negotiations.
Management, recording and publishing companies may argue that
trade practice and, more importantly, efficiency dictate that standard
form agreements continue to be used. Efficiency may be a good reason
for including unilateral rights. The right to renew allows the manager to
reduce a high-risk investment by spreading the risk over a longer time
period. Often the manager will receive virtually no revenue in the early
years of the artist's career and will instead allow the artist to reinvest the
money that would normally be paid to the manager. Also, managers
profit from few of the artists they represent. Managers may argue that
they can only absorb the losses incurred through their unprofitable artists
by receiving a generous share of the revenue from their successful
artists. 44
While the California courts have yet to construe Schroeder, the
question that it raises goes to the root of industry-wide standard form
agreements, e.g., whether fairness and public policy will serve as an underlying basis for considering the enforceability of an agreement between
42. Id.
43. Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R. 237, 241.
44. See also Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality ofBargainingPower: Post-Benthamite
Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTo L. J. 359 (1976). For further discussions of
the law and entertainment industry economics see Biederman, Self-Publishing, Etc.: A Rejoinder, 8:5 ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER 6 (1986) and Graubart, Self Publishing and the
Songwriter/Music PublisherAgreement, 8:4 ENTERTAINMENT LAW REPORTER 3 (1986).
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parties otherwise capable of making binding commitments outside of the
entertainment industry.
2.

Inequality of Bargaining Power and Undue Influence

The Schroeder case also addressed the issue of whether the bargain
was fair.4 5 Lord Diplock, in the course of his judgment, went on to cite a
principle of law apparently directed at the entertainment industry. He
stated the following test for determining the validity of the agreement
before him:
The test of fairness is, no doubt, whether the restrictions are
both reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate
interests of the promisee and commensurate with the benefits
secured to the promisor under the contract. For the purpose of
this test all of the provisions of the contract must be taken into
consideration.4 6
Lord Diplock noted the publishing company's adoption of the familiar "take it or leave it" attitude towards the artist and the artist's responding willingness to enter into the contract.4 7 He also noted that the
publishing company's attitude and its superior bargaining power did not
raise the presumption that the publishing company had exacted an unfair
bargain from the artist.48 Lord Diplock commented that, "in the field of
restraint of trade it calls for vigilance on the part of the Court to see that
they did not [exact an unfair bargain]." 4 9
While judgments are usually limited to the facts before the court,
the decision of the House of Lords in Schroeder clearly sent a message to
the entire entertainment industry of its intended approach to determining
the enforceability of the industry's standard form agreements by applying
the law without a review of all of the underlying facts.
In Davis, the court reviewed Fleetwood Mac's publishing agreements. These agreements bound the composers to the publisher for a
term of five years with a five year renewal right exercisable only by the
publisher.50 Although the composers assigned all of their copyrights to
the publisher, the publisher was not bound to publish any of the works.
Again, this form of contract was then and still is regarded in the industry
as a standard agreement, available in printed form from legal stationers.
45. A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616, 623.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 624.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., [1975] 1 All E.R. 237, 239.
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In this case, the artists were experienced and recognized performers and
composers. In rendering judgment, Lord Denning laid out a series of
criteria and principles for determining the enforceability of an entertainment contract. He stated that the artist may argue that the duration of
the contract was manifestly unfair; in Davis, the ten year term was held
to be as unfair as was the twenty-one year term in Esso Petroleum Co.,
Ltd. v. Harper's Garage (Stourport), Ltd.5 1 The artist may also claim
insufficient consideration for the transfer of copyrights, since he received
grossly inadequate compensation. If the publisher decided not to publish
the artist's works, the artist would receive nothing for his labor and the
publisher would obtain these rights at virtually no cost.
Alternatively, in a case such as Davis where the manager is also the
publisher, the artist may argue that his bargaining power was seriously
impaired by the position in which the manager placed him. The artist
would argue that he was dependent upon the manager to guide him in
making business decisions and that he expected an equitable arm's length
agreement. Finally, the artist may argue that the publisher or manager
detrimentally exerted undue influence on him.52
3.

Independent Legal Advice

The concept of requiring a party to obtain independent legal advice
during contract negotiations is generally absent from the common law. a
However, Lord Denning stated in Davis that where a manager or publisher uses a standard form agreement and exacts onerous terms to drive
an unconscionable bargain, he is under a duty to ensure that the composer or artist receives independent legal advice.54 In O'Sullivan, the
court suggested that a publisher or manager has a duty to ensure that an
artist is provided with independent legal advice to avert the possibility of
undue influence.5 5
These decisions do not indicate with certainty when and under what
circumstances independent legal advice is essential to an enforceable
agreement. Artists and record companies desire to avoid protracted legal
51. [1967] 1 All E.R. 699.
52. Davis, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 240-41.
53. See National Westminster Bank plc. v. Morgan, [1983] 3 All E.R. 85 (C.A.), rev'd,
[1985] 1 All E.R. 821. See also Ogilvie, Undue Influence In the House of Lords, 11 CANADIAN
Bus. L. J. 503, 512 (1986) (House of Lords decided that independent legal advice, or its absence, is a neutral factor in determining whether undue influence had been exerted). However,
it should be noted that this House of Lords decision was rendered one year after O'Sullivan
and ten years after Davis.
54. Davis, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 241.
55. O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, 457.
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negotiations. Consequently, standard forms are offered and signed with
regularity. However, these cases suggest that a manager, publisher or
record company should provide the artist with an agreement that has
been fully negotiated with both sides bargaining on equal footing. They
assume, perhaps naively, the equal competence of the legal talent involved in these negotiations.
4.

The Duty of Good Faith

Most management contracts do not impose an obligation on the
manager to manage. These contracts usually state that the manager is
not obligated to provide employment for the artist. The manager usually
has a right to manage other groups and to devote his efforts to various
artists as he sees fit. On the other hand, these contracts usually tie the
artist, and all decisions affecting the artist's career, to the manager.
In Schroeder, Lord Reid canvassed the obligations that the publisher
owed to the artist. In the absence of an express duty owed by the publisher to an artist, the court held that the contract was unenforceable
when it found an unreasonable restraint of trade.5 6 In short, Lord Reid
did not favor the agreement which assigned the creative rights of an artist to a publisher who had no obligation to do anything with the creation.
However, he did not fully consider those obligations. In Davis, Lord
Denning noted that in the absence of a publisher's express agreement to
use his best efforts to promote the artist's work, an agreement might be
implied.5"
These decisions demonstrate that the English courts have not yet
fully explored the concept of good faith, particularly with regard to management agreements. Apparently, the absence of a duty of good faith
alone would not suffice to render a contract unenforceable, although
courts will consider it as a factor in determining the enforceability of
contracts. The American courts take a different view regarding the duty
of good faith. The case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon ("Lady
Duff-Gordon") has long stood for the proposition that parties to an
agreement undertake an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing."
Thus, an argument made in reliance on English law that a management
agreement lacks mutuality may be severely limited. 9
56.
57.
58.
59.

A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616, 622.
Davis, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 239.
222 N.Y. 88 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1917).
Id. See also Biederman, supra note 44.
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5. The Fiduciary Duty
Managers often serve the role of publishers or record companies for
the artist. These additional roles may give rise to ramifications that are
not initially considered in contract negotiations. The court in Schroeder
stated its strong commitment to assuring that a publishing company did
not exert undue influence on the composer where the publishing company is powerful enough to adopt a "take it or leave it" attitude. In
effect, this places an onerous burden on the publishing company, one
tantamount to a fiduciary duty. 6°
In the Davis case, the manager also acted as the publishing company. The appellant record company argued that the manager's conflict
of interest gravely impaired the composer's bargaining power. Lord
Denning commented on the manager's position as follows:
[The artists'] needs and desires were dependent on his will. He
could say Aye or No. He was skilled in business and finance.
They were composers talented in music and song but not in
business. In negotiation they could not hold their own. That is
why they needed a manager.61
Although the court did not expressly say so, apparently it viewed
the manager as a fiduciary by holding that if the manager wished to acquire publishing rights from artists under contract with him, he had to
ensure that they had equal bargaining power and access to independent
legal advice.62
In O'Sullivan, the parties conceded that the manager, Mills, owed a
fiduciary duty to O'Sullivan, since O'Sullivan had total confidence in and
implicitly trusted him. 63 The court, however, also imputed this fiduciary
duty to the recording, publishing and financial management companies
with which Mills was involved, reasoning that:
[I]n the eyes of O'Sullivan, Mills and the companies were indistinguishable. Although the companies were not formally appointed managers by Mills, in fact they carried out most of the
management functions[,] and this was the intention from the
outset. From the moment he joined Mills, the affairs of
O'Sullivan were run by the companies. They took it upon
themselves to look after him .... Mills was chairman of one of
the companies and Smith and the other directors knew the situ60. See Jossen, FiduciaryAspects of the PersonalManager's Relationship with a Performing
Artist, 11 PERFORMING ARTS REVIEW 108, 112-13 (1981).
61. Davis, [1975] 1 All E.R. at 240-41.
62. Id. at 240-46.
63. O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, 457.
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ation as well as Mills. They knew they were dealing with a
young and inexperienced man who was content to put himself
entirely in their hands and relied entirely on them to give him a
fair deal. They were responsible for the contractual arrangements and they were just as much in a confidential relationship
to O'Sullivan as was Mills himself. In those circumstances the
judge was right to hold that the companies as well as Mills were
fiduciaries....'
The O'Sullivan case places an awesome burden on managers who
also act as publishers or record companies. This decision may place a
manager in a fiduciary relationship, whether he is acting in the capacity
of a record company, publisher or manager. The artist may, therefore,
have an action against any company which is tainted by the artist/manager fiduciary relationship, regardless of whether the manager has acted
as a de facto manager.
The court's reasoning in O'Sullivan, with respect to this fiduciary
duty, was an extension of Lord Denning's decision in Lloyds Bank v.
Bundy, in which a bank was found to be in a fiduciary relationship with
its customer.6 5 Whether the court in O'Sullivan fully understood or fully
reasoned the ramifications of its extension of Lord Denning's decision is
questionable. O'Sullivan, if followed, may place an inordinately onerous
burden on recording and publishing companies. Nevertheless, O'Sullivan
marks the first time that a court has fully considered and construed the
legal relationships in the music industry.
6.

Remedies

Because the agreements in Schroeder and Davis were found to be
void, the courts in those cases simply sought to return the artists to their
pre-contract positions. The court did not pursue the issue of other remedies. The court in O'Sullivan determined that O'Sullivan's agreements
were voidable and ordered the return of copyrights, the reassignment of
mechanical copyrights and an accounting of profits to O'Sullivan. 66
Traditionally, upon finding that a contract is voidable due to a
breach of fiduciary duty, courts will direct that all of the fiduciary's profits be returned to the innocent party. The case of Regal (Hastings)Ltd.
v. Gulliver 67 ("Gulliver") is authority for the equitable doctrine that
those who misuse a fiduciary position for profit are liable to account for
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 456, 477. See also Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, [1975] 1 Q.B. 326 (C.A.).
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
[1967] 2 A.C. 134, 144.
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that profit to their beneficiaries without proof of, and in the entire absence of, fraud and mala fides.6 8 This liability arises simply because a
profit was made.69 In Phipps v. Boardman ("Phipps'), the House of
Lords did not require the breaching fiduciary to account for the entire
resulting profit. 70 In Phipps, the agent Boardman held himself out as a
fiduciary and profited from information that he acquired in that capacity.
The court, faced with a complete absence of malafides, allowed the fiduciary a profit for himself, thereby affirming the Court of Appeal's decision which gave the following reasoning:
If the defendant has done valuable work in making the profit,
then the court in its discretion may allow him a recompense. It
depends on the circumstances. If the agent has been guilty of
any dishonesty or bad faith or surreptitious dealing, he might
not be allowed any remuneration or reward; but when, as in
this case, the agents acted openly and above board, but mistakenly, then it would be only just that they should be allowed
remuneration. 7
In O'Sullivan, the court applied the reasoning in Phipps. 72 The
Court, after finding the contracts voidable, held the recording, publishing
and management companies accountable and ordered these companies to
return all their profits to O'Sullivan, less a reasonable amount for services
rendered, which included profit.7 3 In doing so, the court observed that
O'Sullivan might not have profited at all without the significant contribution of Mills. 74 Unlike in Phipps, the court in O'Sullivan found mala
fides on Mills's part. Whether the Court of Appeal intended in
O'Sullivan to extend the principle in Phipps (of providing a limited benefit to a fiduciary) to one acting with malafides and in breach of his duties
is questionable. The court recognized Mills' conduct and in so doing
limited the profit element to a more modest amount than the "substantial
75
sharing of profits" that was ordered in Phipps.
The reasoning of the English Court of Appeal in O'Sullivan is consistent with California decisions under the Talent Agencies Act. The
California Labor Commissioner allowed a quantum meruit approach in
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id
Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] 1 All E.R. 849 (C.A.), aff'd, [1966] 3 All E.R. 721.
Id. at 857.
O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, 465.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 475.

CONTRACTS

1989]

the case of Bank of America v. Fleming."6 The Commissioner ordered
the personal manager to return only those commissions from services
unlawfully performed as an unlicensed artist's manager and allowed the
manager to retain fees received for services lawfully performed. However, in the absence of a system of binding precedent, the precedential
value of this decision is doubtful.
7.

The O'Sullivan Case and Trust Law

The question for future consideration is whether O'Sullivan is a decision which is representative of traditional trust law or one which is
limited, by its facts, to the kinds of relationships which arise between
artists, personal managers, publishers and record companies. O'Sullivan
is authority for the proposition that damages may result from a breach of
trust where that trust has been imputed. This proposition is consistent
77
with traditional trust law decisions, such as Irving Trust v. Deutsch
("Irving Trust"), in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"one who knowingly joins a fiduciary in an enterprise where the personal
interest of the latter is or may be antagonistic to his trust becomes jointly
'7
and severally liable with him for the profits of the enterprise. 1
However, had the facts in O'Sullivan been present in the Irving
Trust case, that case apparently would have resulted in a per se or strict
liability approach for all profits arising. In Gulliver, the court stated:
[S]uch questions or considerations as whether the profit would
or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff.., or whether he
took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or
whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefitted by
his action [are not relevant in finding the fiduciary accountable
for all profits received]. 7 9
Mr. Justice Fox, in O'Sullivan, commented that "[tlhe rules of equity against retention of benefits by fiduciaries have been applied with
severity."" 0 In Phipps, the court found no mala fides on the part of the
fiduciary."1 The question is whether O'Sullivan represents an erosion of
strict trust principles providing for a trustee's right to act contrary to the
provisions of the trust, deal with the property of the trust for his own
benefit, or violate the basic provisions of trust law regarding his obliga76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Bank of America v. Fleming, No. 1098 ASC MP-432 (Cal. Lab. Comm. 1982).
73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934).
Id. at 125.
Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134, 144.
O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, 474.
Phipps v. Boardman, [1965] 1 All E.R. 849, 862 (C.A.), aff'd, [1966] 3 All E.R. 721.
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tions to his beneficiaries, while still maintaining, on a quantum meruit
basis, a claim for compensation for his activities which ultimately prove
successful for the beneficiaries.
The alteration made in Phipps, appears to be limited to cases where
there is prima facie, bonafides on the part of the fiduciary. 2 A quantum
meruit approach is not at all indicative of typical trust law. The trustee
owes the beneficiary the highest duty, and possibly, any deviation in trust
principles would not occur in the absence of the fiduciary's bona fides.
Thus, the remedy in O'Sullivan may be better viewed as one that is limited only to factually similar cases, rather than one granted in reliance on
trust law.

IV.

BEYOND THE TRILOGY

With surprisingly little reference made to the trilogy, the Chancery
Court of England, almost two years later, embarked on a discussion of
substantially the same issues. Although the Chancery Court is a trial
court and is bound to follow the decisions of both the Court of Appeal
and the House of Lords, it ignored precedent in Elton Hercules John v.
Richard Leon James ("Elton John")."a
Both Elton John and Bernie Taupin ("John and Taupin"), unlike
the artists in the trilogy, were minors when they entered into a standard
form songwriting agreement with Dick James Music ("DJM") in 1967.
DJM entered into subpublishing agreements with foreign affiliates to collect non-United Kingdom royalties from John and Taupin's recordings.
Royalties that John and Taupin received were calculated as a percentage
of DJM's royalties, rather than of those that the local subpublishers received at the source. John and Taupin bound themselves to this agreement for an exclusive period of three years "extendable at the option of
either party for a further three years." 4 In addition, the duo had to
produce at least eighteen songs acceptable to DJM for each three year
period or suffer the extension of the agreement until the prescribed minimum requirement was met. At the same time, John entered into a standard form recording agreement with This Record Co., Ltd., a DJM
affiliate, for a five year term. Both the publishing and recording agreements included the same terms as in the trilogy. Three months after the
82. Id.
83. Elton Hercules John v. Richard Leon James, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 1982 J. No. 15026 (Nov. 29, 1985). A case involving tax issues between John and James
was decided shortly thereafter by the same court. See John and Others v. James and Others,
[1986] Simon's Tax Cases 352 (Mar. 25, 1986).
84. Elton John, 1982 J. No. 15026 at 2.
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execution of the publishing and recording agreements, in 1968, John entered into a management agreement with DJM. Under the terms of the
management agreement, DJM would receive a thirty percent commission
to "use its best endeavours to advance and further Mr. John's professional career and interests ... to secure suitable work and engagements
... and to conduct all negotiations on his behalf, endeavouring to secure
for him at all times the best possible terms""5 for a five year period. The
court noted that "Mr. James's [sic] [of DJM] practice was not to place an
agreement before a writer or artist and ask him to sign then and there,
but to tell him to take the document away, look through it and return it
signed. Only then did Mr. James sign. ' ' 1 6 In this case, since John and
Taupin were both minors, they returned their signed agreements along
with inducement letters executed by their parents. The court noted particularly that neither John nor Taupin was represented by a solicitor or
manager, and that James did not suggest that they seek representation
nor did he explain to them the terms of the contracts. For the songwriting duo, "[b]eing offered a contract by Mr. James [the publisher of the
Beatles] was 'like a dream come true,' " and "they were both scared, very
apprehensive and anxious that Mr. James should like their songs." 7
By March, 1971, the duo had not returned any significant profit to
Mr. James. However, Elton John had just completed demo tapes for an
album which Mr. James considered to be "out of the area of experimentation" and "quite outstanding." 8 The court stated:
So before the album was released and on the strength of his
judgment of the tapes, Mr. James offered Mr. John a new recording agreement. Again the terms were not negotiated [but
royalties were improved] ....
[Elton John] regarded the new
contract as a very good one, giving him security: he appreciated that the new contract involved extending the term of the
existing contract.8 9
In addition, John signed a new management agreement with Mr. Raymond Williams, who had been a longtime confidant of John and Taupin.
In July 1970, John's first album was released in the United States,
and John embarked on a promotional tour of America. After his first
stop in California, John literally became an overnight superstar. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. James exercised his option under the 1967 publishing
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 24.
Elton John, 1982 J. No. 15026 at 24.
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agreement with John and Taupin and increased their royalties. Following John's rise to stardom, Mr. James expressed a desire to renegotiate all
of the existing contracts and told John that he wished him to be represented by solicitors in future dealings." The renegotiation of the management, publishing and recording agreements and a combination of
other factors led John and Taupin to bring an action against DJM in
1982. The most significant of these factors included the increasing popularity and prosperity of the duo, the decision of Instone v. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Ltd., and the advice by American and English counsel
that John and Taupin proceed against DJM (in reliance on the appellate
Schroeder decision) to justify the relative paucity of their publishing royalties and to properly account for royalties received from foreign
subpublishers.91
John and Taupin claimed that the publishing agreements ought to
be set aside on the ground of undue influence, that all copyrights and
master recordings be returned to them. Initially, John and Taupin
claimed that the agreements were an unreasonable restraint of trade, but
later abandoned that claim. The court considered the issues of the duty
of good faith, fiduciary duties and undue influence in deciding not to
return the copyrights or the recordings, but rather to order that compensation be paid to John and Taupin regarding the defendant's unauthorized profit-taking.
1. Good Faith and The Fiduciary Duty
In Elton John, Mr. Justice Nicholls, discussing the recording and
publishing agreements, dismissed the argument that DJM undertook a
duty to use reasonable diligence in good faith to publish, promote and
exploit compositions accepted under the publishing agreements.9 2 In the
absence of a duty of good faith, he stated that "under the publishing
agreements DJM occupied a fiduciary position in respect of any exploitation which it carried out," 93 and that, "commercially, the arrangement
was in the nature of a joint venture, and the writers would need to place
trust and confidence in the publisher over the manner in which it discharged its exploitation function."9 4 He also noted that any assignee of
DJM would assume DJM's fiduciary duty. His decision regarding the
recording contracts was based on the same reasoning. Apparently, the
90. Id. at 26.
91. Id. at 32-35.

92. Id. at 37. See also Biederman, supra note 44.
93. Elton John, 1982 J. No. 15026 at 61.
94. Id. at 62.
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Elton John court has gone further than any of the trilogy courts.
Although it did not extend the fiduciary duty of the manager to the publisher and record company, the Elton John court determined that the
publisher and record company were fiduciaries in their own right. As
Jane Tatt suggested in her article on English music contracts, neither an
artist nor a publisher (record company) intends such a relationship upon
the signing of a publishing (recording) agreement and the music industry
is not structured such that a publisher (record company) can return a
reasonable profit given such a relationship."
In discussing the appropriate remedy with regard to DJM's breach
of its fiduciary duty, the court in Elton John adopted the quantum meruit
approach of O'Sullivan by allowing DJM to retain a reasonable percentage of the profits, but it did not, as in O'Sullivan, order a return of copyrights and delivery up of master recordings. 96 In considering whether
the plaintiffs' claim was time-barred, the court noted that "the relationship between the fiduciary and plaintiff is that of debtor and creditor; it is
not that of trustee and cestique trust."9 This reasoning seems wholly
inconsistent with O'Sullivan's reliance upon trust law and the Phipps
case. The only similarity between O'Sullivan and Elton John is that both
courts were reluctant to rely upon traditional trust law to provide a suitable remedy for a most unusual situation.
2.

"Dominating Influence"

In deciding whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a return of copyrights and master recordings, based upon their primary claim that the
publishing and recording agreements were procured by undue influence,
the Elton John court expounded on the law and the structure of the music industry. Mr. Justice Nicholls set forth the two elements required for
a claim of undue influence (or, as he renamed it, "dominating influence")
as follows:
95. Tatt, Music Publishing and Recording Contracts in Perspective, 5 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORTER

132, 137 (1987).

The American position is grounded in the Lady Duff-Gordon case and its progeny. Recently, the court in the Southern District of New York stated:
A publisher's obligation to promote an author's work is one founded in contract
rather than on trust principles, [and] the "trust elements" in a publisher-author relationship come into play when the publisher tolerates infringing conduct, . . . or participates in it.... Ordinarily, however, the express and implied obligations assumed
by a publisher in an exclusive licensing contract are not, as a matter of law, fiduciary
duties.
Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154, 1157, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
96. Elton John, 1982 J. No. 15026 at 64-76.
97. Id. at 74-75.
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[flirst, a relationship in which one person has a dominating influence over the other and, secondly, a manifestly disadvantageous transaction resulting from the exercise of that
influence.... [I]n appropriate circumstances the existence of a
dominating influence may be presumed; the Court may also,
again in appropriate circumstances, presume that where a dominating influence exists, a manifestly disadvantageous transaction was the result of the exercise of undue influence. 98
Mr. Justice Nicholls determined that Mr. James had a dominating
influence over John and Taupin with respect to the 1967 agreements. He
stated that, even though Mr. James acted in good faith and did not intend to act unfairly, he obtained an unfair advantage by exercising a
dominating influence since no negotiation took place, no explanation of
the terms was provided, and "[John and Taupin] were, as must have been
obvious to him, trusting and relying on him that the contractual terms
were fair and reasonable." 9 9 Mr. Justice Nicholls also found the 1967
agreements significantly disadvantageous since, although the royalty rate
specified was not unreasonable for an unknown artist, it "made no provision for any improvement in the royalty rate if, as happened here, the
artist became a major success."" He summarized the economics of the
music industry:
As a rough guide, a recording company will recoup its recording costs with not more than one artist in ten, and it will make
a significant profit with not more than one artist in thirty.
Bearing this in mind, and that on average a new artist will take
three years to become established, a five year tie in this instance
may not have been unreasonable [so long as royalty rates are
improved when the artist becomes successful].10 1
98. Id. at 93-94.
99. Id. at 98.
100. Id. at 101-02. In determining that the publishing contracts had been procured by undue influence, Mr. Justice Nicholls also noted that the composers had no right to terminate "if
successful publication was not achieved and the writers became aware of another publisher
who had more confidence in their songs." Id.at 97. Tatt, in arguing in favor of providing the
artist with the right to terminate a publishing agreement, suggests that, "the termination provision could, as with other kinds of publishing agreements, be dependent on the failure of the
company to publish the works, or a reasonable proportion of them, within a specified time
limit. Such provision would, it is submitted, not operate unfairly against the company and
would not tie the artist to a disinterested or unsuccessful publisher." Tatt, supra note 95, at
136.
101. Elton John, 1982 J. No. 15026 at 101. As Tatt points out: "[I]n practice, it is now
usual for the royalty rate to be renegotiated if the artist becomes successful. But in [Elton
John], the review was fortuitous, not made pursuant to a contractual obligation, and thus did
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Mr. Justice Nicholls made these comments without appreciating
that Elton John (who is, by any measure, an exceptional songwriter and
performer) took two and one-half years to produce his first album for
sale in the United States and that defendants expended a large amount of
money, resources and skill before John attained success. As with the
fiduciary duty, Mr. Justice Nicholls found the undue influence that the
publishing and recording companies exerted was not the result of a personal management relationship to which the artist was predisposed, but
was wholly independent of that relationship.
The court further held that the post-1967 agreements, in which John
and Taupin were represented by solicitors, did not cure the undue influence of the 1967 agreements. However, the court denied the claim for
reassignment of the copyrights and the master recordings on the grounds
of undue delay in bringing the action (again defining the claim as one for
0 2
debt instead of trust property).
3. Conclusion
In her article, Jane Tatt stated that the Elton John court's refusal to
reassign the copyrights may indicate the onset of a judicial reluctance
toward that remedy. She stated:
[T]he Court, in refusing the reassignment, tacitly recognised
that the Court of Appeal had gone too far in the O'Sullivan
case and it may be that, although such a remedy is available,
...courts will in [the] future be more willing to find that the
circumstances of a case do not justify (reassignment), particu0 3
larly in respect of mechanical copyrights. 1
That Mr. Justice Nicholls tacitly ignored the reasoning in O'Sullivan
is indisputable. That he tacitly adhered to remnants of archaic law without recognizing the realities of the situation may be disputed. Although
Mr. Justice Nicholls restrained himself with respect to the appropriate
remedy, his reasoning certainly shows no restraint. Finally, since the
Elton John case has not been appealed, its precedential value is questionable, since either the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords could have
reversed Mr. Justice Nicholls' decision. In any event, the trilogy still
remains binding precedent on the courts of England.
not alter the finding that the lack of such an obligation was unreasonable and could lead to
oppression by an unscrupulous company." Tatt, supra note 95, at 136.
102. Elton John, 1982 J.No. 15026 at 74.
103. Tatt, supra note 95, at 137.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Standard form contracts continue to be used as a matter of course in
the entertainment industry today; the cases of Schroeder, Davis and
O'Sullivan (and Elton John, to a lesser extent) have had little effect upon°4
what the industry accepts as common agreements and trade practices.'
In addition, the English music trilogy has granted artists the entitlement
to greater protection than they currently receive.
English courts may offer artists protection which exceeds that which
the Talent Agencies Act provides. In considering this proposition, one
might challenge the efficacy of guidelines protecting artists' rights formulated by courts that completely lack expertise regarding the intricacies of
the entertainment industry. 10'
In any event, English courts provide dissatisfied artists with tools to
challenge once desirable contractual agreements. Although courts have
allowed artists to argue that a contract with a ten year term constitutes
an unreasonable restraint of trade, they have made no comments with
respect to five and seven year contracts, which are common in the entertainment industry. The California legislature, however, has limited
the term of recording contracts by a specific 1987 amendment to section
2855 of the Labor Code, which generally limits all personal service contracts to seven years. 106
In addition, English courts have implied that when an artist has
signed a "take it or leave it" contract, he or she may raise the presumption of undue influence. The English courts fail to realize that the vast
majority of contracts in the entertainment industry are "take it or leave
it" contracts. If all successful artists are allowed to challenge once desirable contracts, their efforts would undoubtedly yield conflicting and
anomalous results. Finally, in providing that management, publishing or
recording companies ensure that artists receive independent legal advice,
courts have not addressed the issues of the high cost of legal advice, who
should bear that cost, and the adequacy of the advice.
English courts have applied general rules of law to ensure against
unscrupulous and oppressive conduct with respect to the exploitation of
artists' skill. In so doing, they have formulated a set of rules which are
unique to the entertainment industry, but which lack clear definition. In
104. But see Tatt, supra note 95, at 136.
105. In California, an entertainment commission was set up to advise the Governor on
changes to be made to the Talent Agencies Act. The commission included three artists, three
agents, three managers and the Labor Commissioner. Hertz, supra note 1, at 65-66.
106. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989). The AF of M By-Laws also limit
booking agents' agreements to seven years. By-Laws of the AF of M, art. 23, § 9(a)-(b).
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contrast, the California legislature has enacted specific, yet inadequate
legislation which, by controlling booking agent activities, attempts to
prevent oppressive conduct in the representation of artists. California's
legislation leaves the activities of the personal manager unregulated, but
allows artists to misuse
the law by challenging once desirable manage0 7
1
agreements.
ment
English courts implicitly use a test of unconscionability in judging
the agreements subject to litigation. However, they have erred in two
principal respects. First, they neglect to examine the relationships at the
point of inception from an economic perspective. Second, they fail to
appreciate the crucial role personal managers play, the risks they assume
and the returns they require. English courts could better justify their
decisions and, in some cases, reach better decisions by using an explicit
test of unconscionability. In addition, their approach to the duty of good
faith is dated and impractical. American courts realize that agreements
in the entertainment industry have little meaning without an implicit
duty of good faith. They acknowledge as unrealistic and economically
unfounded, the belief that publishing, recording or management agreements are inherently lacking in mutuality.
Instead of applying tests of undue influence, unreasonable restraint
of trade, fiduciary duties, and the duty of good faith, an all-encompassing, overt test of unconscionability would provide a simpler and more
practical approach.'
Such an analysis must be tempered by a review of
the underlying risks that the manager assumes (which are a function of
the prior successes of the artist) and of the returns which the industry
requires for assuming those risks. Although the economics of the music
industry demands that protection be granted to artists, this protection
must be reconciled with current industry practice and concerns of
efficiency.
English courts have also attempted to apply trust law to the cases
before them. Instead of realizing the inappropriateness of this application of trust law, they bend the laws to reach the "right" results. Thus,
they have formulated unclear rules for determining "just" remedies. In107. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
108. In California, the basic test of "unconscionability" is "whether, in light of the general
background and the needs of the particular case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 com. I (West 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1989). See also Chretian v. Donald L. Bren Co., 151 Cal. App. 3d 385, 198 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1984), which applied § 1670.5. The
court stated that "unconscionability" included "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party."
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terestingly, both the English courts and the California Labor Commissioner (in applying the Talent Agencies Act) have adopted a quantum
meruit approach in ordering managers to account for excessive profits
resulting from oppressive contracts. This approach has allowed them to
apply a "damages-like" remedy to a suit framed in equity. 1°9 Perhaps
they realize that a strict reliance on trust law in ordering the manager to
account for all profits received through his efforts, as well as delivering
master recordings and reassigning copyrights, is too harsh a remedy and
does not recognize the sometimes invaluable contributions of the
manager. 110
In our view, the most sensible approach for a court to take employs
a test of unconscionability coupled with a remedy of damages and the
possible return of copyrights and reassignment of mechanical copyrights.
Although courts in the past have not allowed affirmative suits for damages based on unconscionability, "1 at least one author has suggested that
unconscionability should be actionable as a tort providing damages as an
available remedy. 1 2 A test of unconscionability would be consistent
with the rationale that courts have increasingly applied in entertainment
industry cases. "a In a recent California Supreme Court case, the defense
109. A suit in equity is inconsistent with a claim for damages. Thus, a court which orders
equitable relief in the form of an accounting of profits, while allowing the breaching party to
retain a reasonable percentage of the profits, the copyrights and master recordings, is really
providing the nonbreaching party with the inappropriate remedy of damages. For a discussion
of remedies in law and remedies in equity, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 818-23
(8th ed. 1982). See also infra note 114.
110. O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and Music Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 448, 476.
111. See Pearson v. National Budgeting Sys., Inc., 31 A.D.2d 792, 297 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1969);
Corwin Equip. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 734 F.2d 1581 (11th Cir. 1984); Best v. United
States Nat'l Bank, 78 Or. App. 1, 714 P.2d 1049 (1986), aff'd, 303 Or. 557, 739 P.2d 554
(1987). These cases all dealt with section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
governs sale of goods contracts and from which the wording of California Civil Code section
1670.5 was adopted.
112. See King, The Tort of Unconscionability: A New Tort for New Times, 23 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 97, 115-18 (1979).
113. in applying tests of unconscionability, American courts have examined standard form
agreements much more closely than negotiated ones; see, e.g., In re Hamby, 19 Bankr. 776
(N.D. Ala. 1982). In addition, American courts have been particularly quick to find unconscionability in "take it or leave it" contracts; see, e.g., Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal.
App. 2d 690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961). However, California courts have held that an "adhesion contract," which is a "standardized contract imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength and which relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it," is enforceable, unless it is unduly oppressive or unconscionable; see, e.g., Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1986).
Thus, a standard form contract or a contract offered on a "take it or leave it" basis is not
necessarily unenforceable. Such a result is consistent with the English approach; see, e.g., A.
Schroeder Music Publishing Co., Ltd. v. Macaulay, [1974] 3 All E.R. 616, 624. See also notes
48-49 and accompanying text.
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of unconscionability was successfully asserted where an inequality of bargaining power existed between the parties. The contract, which was a
standard form AF of M agreement between a musician and a promoter
and which imposed an arbitration clause on the promoter on a "take it or
leave it" basis, failed in the court's opinion, to meet the standards of
integrity appropriate for a fair arbitration.' 14 Since California courts
have already applied unconscionability to a case involving an oppressive
contract imposed by an artist, they should have little difficulty finding it
in cases involving oppressive management, publishing or recording
agreements.
California courts, if and when confronted with questionably oppressive management, recording or publishing agreements, will have to make
sense of the English music trilogy and the Elton John case, and then
determine their applicability. The courts may also face issues arising
under the Talent Agencies Act and thus, will have to carefully reconcile
the Act and the common law.

114. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604, 613 P.2d 165 (1981).

